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A hybrid safety injection tank (H-SIT) can enhance the capability of an advanced power
reactor plus (APRþ) during a station black out (SBO) that is accompanied by a severe ac-
cident. It may a useful alternative to an electric motor. The operations strategy of the H-SIT
has to be investigated to achieve maximum utilization of its function. In this study, the
master logic diagram (i.e., an analysis for identifying the differences between an H-SIT and
a safety injection pump) and an accident case classification were used to determine the
parameters of the H-SIT operation. The conditions that require the use of an H-SIT were
determined using a decision-making process. The proper timing for using an H-SIT was
also analyzed by using the Multi-dimensional Analysis of Reactor Safety (MARS) 1.3 code
(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon, South Korea). The operation strategy
analysis indicates that a H-SIT can mitigate five types of failure: (1) failure of the safety
injection pump, (2) failure of the passive auxiliary feedwater system, (3) failure of the
depressurization system, (4) failure of the shutdown cooling pump (SCP), and (5) failure of
the recirculation system. The results of the MARS code demonstrate that the time allowed
for recovery can be extended when using an H-SIT, compared with the same situation in
which an H-SIT is not used. Based on the results, the use of an H-SIT is recommended,
especially after the pilot-operated safety relief valve (POSRV) is opened.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
The Fukushima accident was not managed properly because
of a lack of mitigation systems and strategies against a long-
term station black out (SBO) [1]. The application of passive
features has been suggested for properly mitigating another
severe accident because passive systems do not require.G. Kang).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behaexternal energy supplies and passive safety features can in-
crease the diversity of mitigation techniques [2,3]. For this
reason, passive safety features have become an important
issue in the nuclear field, and a substantial number of studies
related to passive safety have been performed [4e6].
A conventional nuclear power plant (NPP) is primarily
composed of active systems; thus, conventional operatingCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
Fig. 1 e Outline of the hybrid safety injection tank system
[7]. N2, nitrogen; PZR, pressurizer.
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passive safety system is added to a NPP, a new operation
procedure is needed for the effective use of the passive system
alongside the active system. This process is essential to
enhance the safety of NPPs. However, only a few studies in the
nuclear field have addressed the operation strategies of pas-
sive systems. Therefore, the operation strategy for a passive
system should be studied further.
A previous study suggested the principle of a hybrid safety
injection tank (H-SIT) system to enhance the ability of acci-
dent mitigation [7]. Many researchers have worked on H-SIT
systems for the development of passive safety. In brief, the H-
SIT is a new design concept for a passive safety injection
system. The H-SIT system can inject water by using the
pressure from nitrogen gas as a normal SIT in low-pressure
accidents such as a large-break loss-of-coolant accident
(LOCA). The H-SIT system can also inject water by using
gravitational force in over-pressure accidents such as a SBO.
The term “over-pressure” means that the pressure inside a
reactor vessel is higher than the injection pressure of the
safety injection pump (SIP). In over-pressure accident sce-
narios, the SIP cannot inject water because the SIP shut-off
head has a limitation. The H-SIT is the only system that can
inject water without depressurization in over-pressure acci-
dents. Thus, this function of the H-SIT is critical. To drive the
H-SIT in an over-pressure scenario, the battery-driven isola-
tion valves open, and the pressure of the H-SIT is then
balancedwith the pressure of the reactor coolant system (RCS)
through the pressure-equalizing pipe. This pipe is situated
between the H-SIT and the pressurizer (PZR). The process for
driving the H-SIT can be conducted in any pressure range,
which includes the over-pressure situation. Thus, when the
pressure is balanced, the emergency core cooling water can be
injected by using the gravitational force in all scenarios such
as the over-pressure scenario. Fig. 1 presents the outline of the
H-SIT system.
A H-SIT can be used with an active injection system to
increase the diversity of the safety system. A H-SIT is also
planned to adjust to the advanced power reactor plus (APRþ).
Therefore, developing anH-SIT operation strategy is a suitable
example of establishing the parallel operation of passive and
active systems. Hence, this study focused on developing a
methodology for constructing an operations strategy of an H-
SIT, and using it to construct an actual operations strategy. In
section 2, several technical methods are presented for the
development of scenarios in which an H-SIT is suitable. In
section 3, a timing effect analysis is performed for the specific
scenarios that were determined in section 2. The scenario was
analyzed using the thermal-hydraulic code and by calculating
the recovery probability. This study suggests an effective
strategy for the operation of an H-SIT in a conventional NPP
and explains how that strategy is developed logically.2. Scenario development
The H-SIT is primarily used in over-pressure accidents, which
occur when many abnormal conditions coincide. Thus, these
accidents are complicated to analyze. In this accidentsituation, the H-SIT can be also used with many active sys-
tems; therefore, parallel operation between an H-SIT and
active systems should be considered for an operation strategy.
Active systems can be used for accident mitigation instead of
an H-SIT. This suggests that an H-SIT is not applicable to all
accident scenarios. Therefore, applicable scenarios in which
H-SIT needs to be used should first be developed. The
complexity of making an operation strategy for accidents
decreases if applicable scenarios are developed.
2.1. Hybrid safety injection tank functions and
parameters
In this section, parameters are determined to develop appli-
cable scenarios efficiently. Parameters are an important
standard to use to reasonably select applicable scenarios from
among all possible accident scenarios. They also help in
analyzing the characteristics and phenomena of complicated
accidents.
In this study, the parameters were determined by consid-
ering three key points: (1) the plant state, (2) the characteris-
tics and functions of the H-SIT, and (3) the soundness of the
safety systems that are associated with the H-SIT operation.
In an accident situation, the functions of the H-SIT are
duplicated by many active systems. Therefore, whether the
active systems that are relatedwith H-SIT functions are sound
is a very critical point for constructing the operation strategy
of an H-SIT.
The H-SIT was originally designed for the inventory make-
up of the RCS. This function can be used for various purposes
such as pressure control or heat removal. Before developing
Fig. 2 e A portion of the developed master logic diagram for the target plant. CVCS-1, chemical and volume control system;
RCS, reactor coolant system; SCP-1, shutdown cooling pump; SIP, safety injection pump; SIS, safety injection system.
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should be identified. In this study, we used the master logic
diagram (MLD) technique for this purpose. TheMLD technique
starts with a top eventdwhich is defined as an undesired
eventdand proceeds to decompose the top event into simpler
contributing events [8]. If specific contributing events are
determined, the safety functions that are required for a miti-
gating event are also determined. Core damage is the top
event of the MLD because preventing core damage is themain
purpose of the safety injection system. Based on emergency
operating guidelines and technical papers [9,10], safety func-
tions that prevent core damage are identified and modeled in
the MLD, as Fig. 2 shows.
The following four functions of the H-SIT were obtained
from this MLD analysis: (1) RCS inventory control; (2) RCS
pressure control; (3) core heat removal when secondary
cooling is sound; and (4) feed-and-bleed operation. The four
functions obtained through the MLD technique are used for
finding the proper safety systems related to H-SIT operations.
For the RCS inventory control, the safety injection system and
the safety injection tank have to be considered as the safety
systems, based on technical papers [10,12]. For the RCSpressure control, the safety depressurization system and
chemical and volume control system (which function as the
safety injection and pressurizer spray system) have to be
considered. For core heat removal, the safety injection sys-
tem, forced circulation cooling system, natural circulation
cooling system, and shutdown cooling system have to be
considered. For feed-and-bleed operations, the safety injec-
tion system and forced circulation cooling system have to be
considered [11,12]. These are all safety systems related to an
H-SIT operation.
Based on the analysis for safety systems, an active safety
injection system (SIS) is associated with all functions of an H-
SIT. The operation of an H-SIT is closely correlated with the
operation of a SIS. The H-SIT was originally designed as an
injection system; thus, most H-SIT functions can be dupli-
cated by an active SIS [13]. These two systems can be
described as having a functional parallel relationship. Thus,
these two systems can be substituted for each other. Despite
the functional parallel relationship, this substitution is unac-
ceptable for all scenarios because of the different principles of
operation between the H-SIT and the active SIS. Thus, differ-
ences between the H-SIT and active SIS should be identified to
Table 1 e Differences between the safety injection pump, hybrid safety injection tank, and conventional safety injection
tank.
Differences Contents
Electricity ✓ Electricity is required for the SIP operation.
✓ H-SIT and conventional SIT do not require electricity.
Operating pressure ✓ SIP and conventional SIT have a pressure limit for injecting water.
✓ H-SIT can inject water at any pressure.
Method of operation ✓ SIP can inject water directly to the RCS without the operation of other support systems that use electric power.
✓ H-SIT requires several other systems such as an equilibrium valve and pipe. In addition, an H-SIT injects water
by using gravitational force.
✓ SIT can inject water directly to the RCS without the operation of other support systems. It is already pressurized
by nitrogen gas and it uses check valves.
Long-term cooling ✓ Recirculation using a SIP can provide long-term cooling of the RCS.
✓ The H-SIT and SIT have a limited tank inventory. Thus, long-term cooling is impossible.
H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank; RCS, reactor coolant system; SIP, safety injection pump; SIT, safety injection tank.
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cannot be replaced by an active SIS. Under this condition, the
H-SIT should be preferentially used.
An analysis for identifying the differences between the H-
SIT, conventional SIT, and SIP is performed by comparing
their unique characteristics and the characteristics of passive
and active systems [14]. This information is presented in Table
1. The differences between these three systems have to be
considered for determining the parameters because these
differences are used to find scenarios in which H-SIT should
be used instead of an active SIS.
Table 2 presents the parameters for identifying scenarios
for which the H-SIT can be used, based on many consider-
ations. The parameters primarily verify the soundness of the
safety systems and the plant states. The costs of mitigation
actions resulting from radioactive contamination and heat
removal efficiency from the primary side to the secondary side
are also considered when determining the parameters.
This study considered a shutdown cooling pump (SCP) as a
backup low-pressure injection system. The SCP has mechan-
ical properties similar to the low-pressure injection pump;
however, it is only used for long-term cooling in a conven-
tional operation strategy because the nuclear field considers
using one system for multiple purposes is unsafe. However,
the new version of the emergency operating guidelines for theTable 2 e Parameters for a hybrid safety injection tank operat
Standard
Soundness of the SIP When the SIP fails Availability of the SCP for
Differences between
SIP and H-SIT
Electricity Soundness of the electrici
Operating pressure Pressure of the RCS
Soundness of the SG
Soundness of depressuriz
If depressurization is poss
Temperature difference be
removal through the SG
Operating method LOCA point
Long-term cooling Availability of the SCP for
Maintain the PAFS
Recirculation
H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank; LOCA, loss-of-coolant accident; PAFS,
shutdown cooling pump; SG, steam generator; SIP, safety injection pumpAPR1400 [9] indicates that a SCP can be used for low-pressure
injection in an urgent accident situation because this proce-
dure can enhance the diversity of safety systems.
An H-SIT system can inject water during low-pressure ac-
cidents. This function is also used with a conventional SIT
that has well-developed operation procedures by the Engi-
neered Safety Features Actuation System signal. Thus, the
operation procedures of an H-SIT during low-pressure condi-
tions are not a target of this study.
2.2. Classification of the accident cases
Accidents in NPPs can be divided into two categories: single-
failure accidents and multiple-failure accidents. A single-
failure accident is characterized by a single event such as a
LOCA or steam generator tube rupture. A multiple-failure ac-
cident is characterized by two ormore events. Multiple-failure
accidents have not been considered a common issue in the
past. However, after the Fukushima accident, many in-
dividuals believe that multiple failures may occur during
natural disasters.
The Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) conducting
report selects several single events as the initiating event [11].
These initiating events, except for SBO, are not considered
scenarios for the operation of an H-SIT because it has theion strategy.
Parameter
safety injection
ty
ation system
ible Radioactive contamination of containment
tween the primary and secondary sides (for the efficiency of heat
)
long-term cooling
passive auxiliary feedwater system; RCS, reactor coolant system; SCP,
.
Fig. 3 e Classification of the accident cases. LOCA, loss-of-coolant accident; SG, steam generator; SIP, safety injection pump.
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dents for which a SIP cannot inject water. When an initiating
event occurs, an SIP and passive auxiliary feedwater system
(PAFS) are supposed to be sufficient [11]. Thus, a SIP can be
used after the pressure is decreased below the SIP shut-off
head using the PAFS in single events [15]. Therefore, an H-
SIT must be retained for an unexpected over-pressure sce-
nario that is caused by multiple accidents. Thus, H-SIT sys-
tems are typically used during multiple-failure accidents.
Several scenarios exist for multiple-failure accidents in an
NPP. An operating procedure cannot be developed for each of
these scenarios. This study classifies all scenarios into a few
cases for the development of an effective operation procedure.
The operation procedure is developed on a case-by-case basis.
Clear standards are required to classify scenarios. The
soundness of the SIP is a very important standard for classi-
fying scenarios because the H-SIT and SIP have a functionally
parallel relationship. The function of theH-SIT can be replaced
with the function of the SIP. In addition, the SIP operation
typically has a higher priority for injecting water, compared
with the H-SIT operation, because the SIP can inject coolant
without regard to water inventory. The H-SIT should be used
for high-pressure accidents caused by unexpected situations.
Therefore, whether the SIP can work is critical when an oper-
ator decides to operate the H-SIT. In addition, an H-SIT uses
gravitational force to inject water. Therefore, it cannot be used
simultaneously with an active injection system such as an SIP
because an active pump causes a pressure difference in the
RCS. Using gravitational force to inject water is difficult if a
pressure difference occurs in the RCS [16]. Thus, the SIP oper-
ationhas a large effect on the operatingprocedureof theH-SIT.
The purpose of the operating procedure for the H-SIT is to
mitigate accidents. To achieve effective mitigation, accidents
must be clearly understood in terms of their phenomena and
their impact on the plant. Therefore, to construct an optimal
operating procedure, several accidents with phenomena that
cannot be easily distinguished are considered as one case, and
accidents that have a similar effect on the steam supply sys-
tem are considered as one case. To establish these cases, this
study refers to the following three standards from the emer-
gency operating guidelines: (1) whether electricity is available;(2) whether a steam generator is available; and (3) whether a
LOCA occurs [9].
The four standards for classifying accidents are the
following: (1) the availability of electricity, (2) the soundness of
the steam generator (SG) cooling system (e.g., the PAFS), (3) the
occurrence of LOCA, and (4) the soundness of the SIP. Fig. 3
presents the classification logic. These four classification
criteria yield 12 accident cases. This study assumes that cases
9, 10, 11, and 12 are not target cases for developing the oper-
ating procedure of an H-SIT with an active system because
active systems cannot work in these cases. Therefore, cases
9e12 do not require a procedure for parallel operation.
2.3. Reorganization of parameters
In the previous, section, all parameters used to develop
applicable scenarios were determined and then the accident
cases were classified. The parameters presented in Table 2 are
generally used to identify the scenarios for all cases of mul-
tiple accidents. Not all parameters were used to develop the
operating procedure of the H-SIT for any particular accident
case because not all of them are relevant to every case. Thus,
the parameters that are needed for developing scenarios in
each case should be distinguished. The parameters were
therefore reorganized to find the proper parameters for
developing applicable scenarios in each case.
In section 2.2, the cases were divided by specific standards.
Therefore, different cases have different conditions. Thus, to
find appropriate parameters for each case, the parameters
were also reorganized by using the same standards as the
case. The reorganization process is described in Table 3. This
process is used to match the conditions with the proper pa-
rameters. If operators know the conditions of the accident
case, then they automatically know the parameters that they
have to check by using this process.
2.4. The decision process for the applicable conditions of
H-SIT operation
The H-SIT uses gravitational force to inject water after
pressure between the pressurizer and RCS is equalized in an
Table 3 e Parameters reorganized, based on the accident conditions.
Conditions Parameters
All RCS pressure
Long-term cooling (recirculation)
Availability of depressurization
SG Working When the pressure is higher than the SIP operating pressure,
check the efficiency of the heat removal through the SG
Maintain the PAFS
Availability of the SCP for long-term cooling
Radioactive contamination
Not working Radioactive contamination
SIP Working e
Not working Availability of the SCP for low-pressure injection
LOCA Occurs LOCA point
Does not occur e
LOCA, loss-of-coolant accident; PAFS, passive auxiliary feedwater system; RCS, reactor coolant system; SCP, shutdown cooling pump; SG, steam
generator; SIP, safety injection pump.
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causes a pressure difference in the RCS, which makes water
injection using gravitational force difficult. Therefore, an H-
SIT cannot be used simultaneously with an active injection
system such as a SIP [16]. For this reason, the operation
strategy of an H-SIT with an active system should focus on
prioritization between the H-SIT and active injection systems.
A decision process is therefore needed.
For the decision process, parameters were determined by
using the reorganized table in section 2.3. This process de-
termines which system between the H-SIT and active injec-
tion systems should be used in a specific accident condition.
Therefore, the conditions that necessitate the use of the H-SIT
can surely be determined by the decision process. Those
conditions can be interpreted as an applicable scenario of H-
SIT operation. This process is performed for every case to
identify applicable scenarios. The decision process for the
applicable scenarios of the H-SIT operation is described in
Tables 4 and 5. These decision processes are made by using
the information of cases 3 and 5 as examples.2.5. The development of scenarios for which the H-SIT
should be used
An important characteristic of the H-SIT is that it cannot be
used for long-term cooling because it has a limited amount of
water. The H-SIT can only be used for temporary mitigation.
Thus, the H-SIT is primarily used to extend the allowed time
for the recovery of the components that have failed, rather
than to mitigate accidents perfectly.
The decision process suggests there are 14 scenarios in
which the H-SIT should be used in an accident scenario. The
scenarios are listed in Table 6.
According to the analysis, the use of the H-SIT is required
to extend the allowed time for the recovery from five failures:
SIP failure, PAFS failure, depressurization system failure, SCP
failure, and recirculation system failure. When these failures
occur, the use of the H-SIT is first comparedwith the use of the
other active systems. If the recovery fails during the extended
allowed time for recovery using the H-SIT, then the otheractive systems can be used. This is the basic operation strat-
egy of an H-SIT with active systems.
The results of the decision process also demonstrate that
each scenario has its own pressure range in which the H-SIT
can be used. The pressure ranges are listed below. There are
four pressure ranges for the H-SIT: (1) SIP maximum injection
pressureePressure Safety Valve (PSV) open pressure; (2)
shutdown pressureePSV open pressure; (3) maximum SCP
operating pressureePSV open pressure; (4) maximum SCP
operating pressureeshutdown pressure.3. Timing effect analysis
3.1. The set of conditions
Each scenario has proper pressure ranges in which the H-SIT
must be used. Thus, the injection time of the H-SIT also has a
range because it can be used at any time if the RCS pressure is
within the proper range. The efficiency of the H-SIT can
change, depending on the time until use. In this section, a
timing effect analysis will be performed to determine the best
time to use the H-SIT.
The H-SIT was modeled by using the thermal-hydraulic
code MARS KS ver. 1.3. The reference plant model is an
APRþ. The code inputs of the APRþ and H-SIT were provided
by Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd. (KHNP).
In this study, the allowed time for the recovery extension
of the depressurization system is a target function of the
H-SIT. The valves are easily fixed, compared with other
components such as the SIP pump. Thus, the extension of the
allowed time for recovery via using the H-SIT has a consider-
able effect when the valve fails. Two pressure ranges are
selected for this analysis: (1) SIP maximum injection pres-
sureePSV open pressure and (2) shutdown pressureePSV
open pressure.
In accidents within pressure range 1, a small-break LOCA
occurs, the SIP is sound, and the SG and depressurization
system fails. These are the same conditions as in case 5 of the
classification. A change in the PZR pressure in this condition is
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 4 3e4 5 3 449illustrated in Fig. 4. This study assumes that the break size is
0.01 ft2.
After a shutdown, the pressure decreases rapidly because
of the trip and the LOCA. The SIP injection signal then occurs.
When the main steam safety valve is open, the decay heat is
removed from the SG; thus, the RCS temperature remains
nearly constant until the SG dries out. For this reason, the
pressure of the RCS remains constant until the SG dries out.
After the SG dries out, the pressure of the RCS starts to in-
crease because the RCS loses its heat sink. The SIP will not
work once the RCS pressure exceeds the SIP's maximum in-
jection pressure. In this scenario, nowater can be injected into
the RCS if the depressurization system is not recovered. The
code finally stops at approximately 6300 seconds because of
cladding failure caused by a peak cladding temperature
exceeding 1477 K. Usually fuel cladding fails if the cladding
temperature exceeds 1477 K [17]. If the cladding has failed, a
substantial amount of radiation must be released through the
break. Thus, technicians can no longer fix failed components.
Therefore, the allowed time for recovery is defined as the time
between the occurrence of an accident and the occurrence of
the cladding failure.
The SIP can be used when the RCS pressure is below the
SIP's maximum injection pressure (12.47 MPa). Therefore, an
H-SIT would typically used after the RCS pressure exceeded
12.47 MPa in this scenario. Two operation times for the H-SIT
were selected based on the availability of the safety system
and the change in the PZR pressure. These times occur when
the RCS pressure exceeds the SIP's maximum injection pres-
sure and the pilot-operated safety relief valve's (POSRV's) open
time.
In accidentswithin range 2, a small-break LOCA occurs and
the SIP, SG, and depressurization system fail. A change in the
PZR pressure is illustrated in Fig. 5. These conditions are the
same as those in case 7 of the classification. This study also
assumes that the break size is 0.01 ft2.
This pressure change is similar to that in case 1. However,
damage to the core occursmore rapidly in case 2 than in case 1
because the SIP is not functional in this scenario. The calcu-
lation is stopped at approximately 3500 seconds because of
the high cladding temperature, as in case 1.
In this case, four operation times of the H-SIT are selected,
based on the trends in the PZR pressure. These times are (1)
the fastest operable time, (2) themain steam safety valve open
time, (3) the SG dry out time, and (4) the POSRVopen time. This
study assumes that the operator requires 5 minutes to use the
H-SIT after shutdown. Therefore, the fastest operable time is
300 seconds.
3.2. Results of the timing analysis for the H-SIT
The use of the H-SIT can extend the allowed time for the re-
covery of the depressurization system. If the depressurization
system is recovered, the SIP can be operated with depressur-
ization. Therefore, the function of the H-SIT is required in this
scenario. A change in the PZR pressure depends on the oper-
ation timing of the H-SIT, as depicted in Fig. 6.
Table 7 illustrates that if theH-SIT is used, the allowed time
for the recovery of the depressurization system can be
extended by up to 11,224 seconds, compared with when the
Table 5 e Process for determining the conditions that are applicable to the hybrid safety injection tank operation (Case 5).
Parameters Conditions and decisions
RCS pressure SIT operating pressureeMaximum
SIP operating pressure
Maximum SIP operating pressureePSV open pressure
Depressurization N/A Possible Impossible
Recirculation cooling N/A Possible Impossible N/A
Radioactive contamination N/A H-SIT is superior to SIP N/A
System selection H-SIT Do not use Use Use Use
SIP Use Conditional Use Cannot Use Cannot Use
H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank; N/A, not applicable; RCS, reactor coolant system; PSV, pressure safety valve; SIP, safety injection pump; SIT,
safety injection tank.
Table 6 e Scenarios for which the hybrid safety injection tank should be used.
Case Applicable scenarios
Cases 1 and 2 If the PAFS maintains a failure status, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the PAFS.
If recirculation is impossible, depressurization is also impossible. Hence, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of
the recirculation system.
If depressurization is impossible, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the depressurization system.
Cases 3 and 4 If the SCP fails, no water can be injected into the primary side. Thus, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the
SIP or SCP.
If PAFS maintains a fail status, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the PAFS.
If depressurization is impossible, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the depressurization system.
If recirculation is impossible, depressurization is also impossible. Thus, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of
the recirculation system.
Cases 5 and 6 If the SG fails, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the SG before starting the F&B operation.
If depressurization is impossible, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the depressurization system.
If recirculation is impossible, depressurization is also impossible. Thus, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of
the recirculation system.
Cases 7 and 8 If the SG fails, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the SG before starting the F&B operation.
If the SCP fails, no water can be injected into the primary side. Thus, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the
SIP or SCP.
If depressurization is impossible, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of the depressurization system.
If recirculation is impossible, depressurization is also impossible. Thus, the H-SIT is used to extend the repair time of
the recirculation system.
F&B, feed-and-bleed; H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank; PAFS, passive auxiliary feedwater system; RCS, reactor coolant system; SCP, shutdown
cooling pump; SG, steam generator; SIP, safety injection pump.
Fig. 4 e Pressurizer pressure during a transient in case 1 without hybrid safety injection tank operation. SIP, safety injection
pump.
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Fig. 5 e Pressurizer pressure during a transient in case 2 without hybrid safety injection tank operation.
Fig. 6 e Pressurizer pressure during a transient in case 1 for various hybrid safety injection tank initiation times. H-SIT,
hybrid safety injection tank; POSRV, pilot-operated safety; SIP, safety injection pump.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 4 3e4 5 3 451H-SIT is not used. If the H-SIT is used after the POSRV opens,
the efficiency of the H-SIT is higher than when the H-SIT is
used immediately. Therefore, the H-SIT should be used after
the POSRV opens.
The use of the H-SIT can also extend the allowed time for
the recovery of the depressurization system in case 2. When
the SIP is fixed, the SIP cannot inject water if theTable 7 e Efficiency of the hybrid safety injection tank,
based on the operation timing in case 1.
H-SIT operation timing Allowed time
for recovery
(extension rate)
No H-SIT 6302 sec (0.0%)
H-SIT operation when the SIP is stopped 10,861 sec (72.3%)
H-SIT operation when the POSRV is open 11,224 sec (78.1%)
H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank; POSRV, pilot-operated safety
relief valve; SIP, safety injection pump.depressurization system is not recovered because of the RCS
pressure. The H-SIT can also be used to extend the allowed
time for the recovery of the depressurization system under
this condition. The change in the PZR pressure is based on the
time required to use the H-SIT, as depicted in Fig. 7.
Table 8 shows that if the H-SIT is used, the allowed time for
the recovery of the depressurization system can be extended
by up to 8353 seconds, compared with when the H-SIT is not
used. The efficiency of the H-SIT when used after the POSRV
opens is the best case among the four cases. Thus, the H-SIT
should be used after the POSRV opens.
3.3. The change in the recovery probability
The change in the recovery probability is a suitable criterion
for measuring the effect of extending the allowed time for
recovery by operating the H-SIT. This change is closely
correlated with plant safety. The change in the recovery
probability is calculated to determine the effect of the H-SIT in
an accident scenario.
Fig. 7 e Pressurizer pressure during the transient in case 2 for various hybrid safety injection tank initiating times. H-SIT,
hybrid safety injection tank; MSSV, main steam safety valve; POSRV, pilot-operated safety; SG, steam generator.
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The MTTR varies, depending on the accident condition, valve
type, and MTTR distribution. Therefore, an assumption is
used when calculating the change in the recovery probability.
One assumption is that the MTTR has a log-normal distribu-
tion. Detailed information for the log-normal distributions of
all types of valves is provided in Table 9 [18]. The previous
section recommended using the H-SIT after the open time of
the POSRV. Therefore, another assumption in this calculation
is the use of 11,224 seconds and 8353 seconds as the repre-
sentative allowed times for recovery (TA) for case 1 and case 2,
respectively.Table 8 e Efficiency of the hybrid safety injection tank
based on the operation timing in case 2.
H-SIT operation timing Allowed time
for recovery
(extension rate)
No H-SIT 3503 sec (0.0%)
The fastest H-SIT operation time 7975 sec (127.7%)
H-SIT operation when the MSSV is open 7808 sec (122.8%)
H-SIT operation when the SG dries out 8043 sec (129.6%)
H-SIT operation when the POSRV is open 8353 sec (138.4%)
H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank; MSSV, main steam safety valve;
POSRV, pilot-operated safety relief valve; RCS, reactor coolant
system; SG, steam generator.
Table 9 e In-plant reliability data system parameters for
the log-normal distribution of the repair times [18].
Parameter IPRDS information
Number of observations 2809
Mean time 5.2 h
Median time 4.0 h
Mode time 2.0 h
Standard deviation 3.2 h
Maximum repair time 880 h
Minimum repair time 0.5 h
IPRDS, in-plant reliability data system.The principle of the calculation is that the valve recovery is
considered a “success” if the MTTR of the failed valve is less
than the representative allowable time. Thus, p (MTTR < TA) is
the probability of the valve recovery. In general, a log-normal
distribution has the expectation and variance as shown below
in which (E(X) is the expectation, V(X) is the variance, m is the
expectation of normal distribution, and s is the standard de-
viation of normal distribution).
EðXÞ ¼ emþs2=2
VðXÞ ¼ e2mþs2

es
2  1

The expectation and the standard deviation of the normal
distribution can be determined by using the aforementioned
equations. If the expectation and the standard deviation of the
normal distribution are determined, then the repair probability
canbedeterminedusingcumulativedistribution function (F(x)):
FðXÞ ¼ 

lnðxÞ  m
s

Table 10 shows that if the H-SIT is used, the repair proba-
bility increases from5.1% to 26.8%. Table 11 illustrates that theTable 11 e The change in the repair probability
calculation for case 2.
Case 2 Allowed time for recovery Repair probability
No H-SIT 3503 sec 0.39%
With H-SIT 8353 sec 12.7%
H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank.
Table 10 e The change in the repair probability
calculation for case 1.
Case 1 Allowed time for recovery Repair probability
No H-SIT 6302 sec 5.1%
With H-SIT 11,224 sec 26.8%
H-SIT, hybrid safety injection tank.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 4 4 3e4 5 3 453repair probability increases from 0.39% to 12.7%, if the H-SIT is
used. Thus, the use of the H-SIT is an effective method for
repairing the depressurization valve. This repair probability is
increased further if the H-SIT is used after the POSRV opens.
The repair probability of a depressurization system is not
very high in multiple accident cases because these accident
cases assume very severe conditions. By contrast, this study
used many conservative parameters. This study nevertheless
shows that using the H-SIT is an effective way to improve
plant safety.4. Conclusion
An optimum operation strategy for an H-SIT with an active
system was analyzed in this paper. The results of this anal-
ysis demonstrate that the use of the H-SIT is primarily
required to extend the allowed time for the recovery from
five failures: SIP failure, PAFS failure, depressurization sys-
tem failure, SCP failure, and recirculation system failure.
These results also demonstrated that each scenario has its
own pressure range that requires the use of the H-SIT. Thus,
the available injection time of the H-SIT has a range because
each scenario has a pressure range. The efficiency of the H-
SIT can change, based on the time to use. Therefore, a
sensitivity study was performed using the thermal-hydraulic
code MARS KS ver. 1.3 to find the optimal operation time of
the H-SIT. Two pressure ranges were selected for the sensi-
tivity analysis. The code result of case 1 demonstrates that if
the H-SIT is used, the allowed time for the recovery of the
depressurization system can be extended by up to 11,224
seconds, compared with when the H-SIT is not used. The H-
SIT should ideally be used when the POSRV valve opens. This
extended allowed time for recovery affects the repair prob-
ability. In case 1, the repair probability increases from 5.1% to
26.8% when the H-SIT was used. For case 2, the allowed time
for recovery of the depressurization system can be extended
by up to 8353 seconds by using the H-SIT, compared with
when the H-SIT is not used. In addition, the H-SIT should
ideally be used when the POSRV valve opens. The repair
probability increased from approximately 0.39% to 12.7% in
case 2.Conflicts of interest
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